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Abstract
Context
Health policy has long been preoccupied with the problem that health insurance stimulates
spending (“moral hazard”). However, much health spending is costly healthcare that unin-
sured individuals could not otherwise access. Field studies comparing those with more or
less insurance cannot disaggregate moral hazard versus access. Moreover, studies of
patients consuming routine low-dollar healthcare are not informative for the high-dollar
healthcare that drives most of aggregate healthcare spending in the United States.
Methods
We test indemnities as an alternative theory-driven counterfactual. Such conditional cash
transfers would maintain an opportunity cost for patients, unlike standard insurance, but
also guarantee access to the care. Since indemnities do not exist in U.S. healthcare, we
fielded two blinded vignette-based survey experiments with 3,000 respondents, randomized
to eight clinical vignettes and three insurance types. Our replication uses a population that is
weighted to national demographics on three dimensions.
Findings
Most or all of the spending due to insurance would occur even under an indemnity. The
waste attributable to moral hazard is undetectable.
Conclusions
For high-cost care, policymakers should be more concerned about the foregone efficient
spending for those lacking full insurance, rather than the wasteful spending that occurs with
full insurance.
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Introduction
Although insurance enhances welfare by laying off risk [1] some have estimated that insurance
may do more harm than good. [2,3,4,5] Standard health economics theory stipulates that
insurance stimulates wasteful spending by insulating patients from the marginal cost of the
healthcare they consume. This wasteful spending may take the form of consumption of low-
value healthcare, or the failure to pursue lower-cost providers of healthcare, or perhaps even
the pursuit of riskier lifestyles that create more need for healthcare in the first place (not the
focus of the present paper). On this theory of “moral hazard” insurance creates a collective
action problem: individual decisions drive up insurance premiums by consuming care that
people would not rationally want if they bore its marginal costs. [6,7] Indeed, a landmark field
experiment showed that patients receiving more fulsome insurance spent more on healthcare,
with no detectable health b50enefits for median patients. [8] This theory and data have influ-
enced a generation of scholarship in favor of substantial cost exposures in health insurance.
For example, leading economists have proposed that patients pay a 50% coinsurance rate with
no cap on out-of-pocket exposure. [9]
This work has been deeply influential on U.S. policy, which has eschewed universal and ful-
some coverage. [10] When President Bill Clinton proposed an expansion of health insurance,
he worried that, “many of us who have had fully paid health care plans have used the system
whether we needed it or not without thinking what the costs were.” [11] In a contemporaneous
survey, economists resoundingly endorsed the moral hazard theory, and many opposed the
creation of national health insurance coverage. [12] When President George W. Bush
expanded health savings accounts (rather than insurance), he complained that insured patients
“really don’t know the true costs of medical services they receive.” [11] Even President Oba-
ma’s effort to expand health insurance left families exposed to over $16,300 per year in out-of-
pocket expenses (for 2020), which can bankrupt even middle-class families. [13,14]
More recent economic work suggests a more nuanced account of insurance. In a range of
clinical situations, Baicker, Mullainnathan, and Schwartzstein note that patients seem to forgo
highly efficient healthcare. [15] Even when healthcare is deeply subsidized or free, some dia-
betics do not adhere to their insulin regimens and some patients with heart disease do not take
their beta blockers, for examples. The authors suggest that in these special situations where
individuals may be biased against consumption, optimal copays should sometimes be zero, or
perhaps negative. They coin a term, ‘negative behavioral hazard,’ to describe the tendency of
individuals to under-consume valuable health care interventions, in contrast to ‘positive
behavioral hazard,’ which is the tendency of individuals to over-consume interventions lacking
value.
In this same vein, Brot-Goldberg and associates recently studied a change to greater cost-
sharing exposure among a group of highly-paid employees, and found that, while it reduced
spending, the intervention did not cause greater price-shopping. [16] In other work, high-
deductible healthcare plans have been shown to reduce health spending, but also reduce
appropriate preventative care and medication adherence. [17] Recent research suggests that
providers may drive spending choices to a much greater degree than patients. [18,19]
Our study adds to the literature in the following two ways. First, we use indemnities as an
alternative theory-driven counterfactual in two vignette-based survey experiments with a
high-dollar healthcare setting. Second, our analysis of the experimental outcome provides evi-
dence that most of the healthcare spending from insured consumers would occur even under
an indemnity. There is no detectable waste attributable to moral hazard triggered by insurance
in the high-dollar healthcare context.
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High-cost care and the indemnity counterfactual
To understand the effects of any intervention, such as health insurance, the analyst must com-
pare it to the alternative, or counterfactual. Economists have traditionally focused on uninsur-
ance as the counterfactual for health insurance. Summarizing this “general theory that health
economists apply to insurance,” leading economist and governmental advisor Mark Pauly
explains that “‘[m]oral hazard’ . . . is generally. . . inefficient, because some of the use of medi-
cal care that insurance stimulates (compared with having no insurance, when a person pays the
full market price) must by definition be care that is worth less to the person than its market
price.” [20]
While the uninsurance counterfactual is arguably appropriate for low-price consumption
(e.g., a generic drug) that is available to both insured and uninsured people alike, it may not be
appropriate for high-cost care or poor consumers. In 2015, half of all health expenditures fell
on just 5% of the population, and that group spent $50,572 on average, which is also roughly
the income for an entire year for a median Americans. [21] In such cases where the care is
unaffordable, an uninsured or underinsured patient’s “choice” not to consume arguably does
not reveal anything about their valuation of the non-consumed goods and services. [22]
John Nyman argues that people buy health insurance not just to spread the risk of large
expenses; they seek access to healthcare they otherwise could not afford to consume. [23,24] In
addition to insufficient wealth, illness often causes income loss, which thus reduces how much
healthcare sick persons could buy out of pocket. [25,26] Nyman’s theory has been largely
ignored by health economists, [27] perhaps because the theory has not seemed conducive to
empirical testing and because it makes it more difficult to make policy-relevant inferences
from the fact that health insurance stimulates health spending. The additional spending could
be beneficial to welfare, since it provides individuals with the necessary purchasing power to
access valuable care.
Yet, increased spending due to insurance may still reflect welfare losses, as consumers do
not bear marginal costs. They could, for example, spend $100,000 of the insurer’s money to
access care worth only $5,000. To distentangle access from moral hazard–a necessity to set
optimal insurance policy–a more appropriate counterfactual for insurance is necessary.
In the contemporary U.S. since the 1950s, health insurance benefits are largely paid in-kind
to reimburse healthcare providers for the goods and services they provide, rather than paid as
cash to the beneficiaries. [28] In contrast, indemnities are a form of insurance, which pays ben-
efits in cash-equivalents to the beneficiary, rather than paying them in-kind to healthcare pro-
viders. Scholars have proposed such an indemnity system for healthcare. [29,30,31] Cutler and
Zeckhauser have argued that indemnities would be “optimal . . . and the simplest health insur-
ance policy.” [32]
Indeed, U.S. automobile insurers sometimes pay cash benefits. [33] Worldwide, there are
established markets for indemnities keyed to medical occurrences [34,35] often sold as riders
to life insurance policies. [36] These are sometimes known as “dreaded disease” plans, and are
largely supplementary to traditional health insurance coverage of medical expenses. Similarly,
in the U.S., there is a growing market for “critical illness” insurance plans, which have “are
often pitched as an insurance policy for your health insurance policy.” [37]
Aside from laying off risk and providing access to otherwise unaffordable care, insurance
has other functions, such as bundling insureds into groups, which have greater market power
to negotiate prices (with the threat of excluding a provider from a network), compared to indi-
viduals who nominally face undiscounted “list” prices. [38] On the other hand, uninsured indi-
viduals often receive discounted prices based on lower administrative costs and their ability to
pay, which can actually then be less than prices offered to insurers. [39] Although it would be
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more complicated, an insurer could provide this provider-bargaining function, like a discount
card, even if it paid benefits to insureds under an indemnity. (In our experimental framework
below, we hold constant the price between indemnities, traditional insurance, and uninsured
conditions.)
Although they are not used for primary health insurance coverage in the United States
today, indemnities are interesting as a potential real-world mechanism for financing health-
care and protecting patients from risk. [40] But even if indemnities were completely impracti-
cal (perhaps because of fraud or other problems), they are theoretically interesting as a
counterfactual for decomposing the effects of health insurance, as shown in Fig 1. Indemnity
maintains an opportunity cost for patients, unlike standard insurance. Indemnity also guaran-
tees access to care, unlike uninsurance. The consumption rate under an indemnity thus
explains away some of the marginal consumption under traditional insurance, since these
individuals would consume even if the insurance were fungible (creating opportunity costs),
but do not consume when uninsured (lacking access).
Thus, the analyst needs estimates of consumption for identically-situated patients under
uninsurance, indemnity, and traditional insurance. Those with insurance who would consume
even if they did not have insurance (as shown in the uninsured counterfactual), are merely
using insurance to spread the risks of being exposed to costly care, as in classic economic the-
ory. To estimate the access function of insurance, the analyst measures the difference in pro-
portions on intent to consume between those who are uninsured versus those insured by
indemnity, holding all else constant. To measure truly wasteful marginal spending under tradi-
tional in-kind insurance, the analyst looks to the difference in rates of treatment consumption
between those with indemnities versus traditional insurance. This measure allows an estimate
of the moral hazard effect of insurance, since access is controlled in both conditions, but the
consumer’s price signal is eliminated in traditional insurance.
Nyman and colleagues have recently empirically estimated the size of the access effects of
insurance, by examining other income shocks and their effects on healthcare consumption, as
an analogy to true indemnities keyed to illness. [41] This population-survey approach is not
Fig 1. Theoretical model for decomposing effects of health insurance from two counterfactual conditions. Values are hypothesized for illustration. Reproduced with
permission [40].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231768.g001
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keyed to the sorts of expensive healthcare consumption decisions that drive most health spend-
ing. In contrast, a simulated indemnity insurance policy would provide a more direct concep-
tual test. We are aware of no direct empirical studies of the effects of indemnities on medical
care consumption, which allow such direct comparisons of the appropriate counterfactuals.
Materials and methods
We seek to simulate identically-situated patients with no insurance, traditional insurance, or
indemnity insurance, in contexts of high-value and low-value healthcare. Lacking archival
data on indemnities for primary health coverage and unable to randomize patients to true
uninsurance in the field, we constructed a randomized vignette-based survey experiment.
Vignette-based research has become a staple of social science generally and useful for simulat-
ing discrete choices in healthcare research in particular. [14,42–44] Online populations are an
increasingly powerful way to collect large amounts of data from attentive respondents, with
high levels of attention and demographic representativeness. [45–47]
Vignettes
In two experiments, we sought to simulate realistic clinical situations culminating with
patients deciding, “. . .would you take [the treatment]?” We asked respondents to explain that
decision in writing as well.
Vignettes were constructed around common medical conditions in the US, for which some
costly intervention is presented to and being considered by the patient. The intervention can
be carried out on an elective or semi-elective basis: patient decisions are made in a non-emer-
gent setting. For example, Experiment 1 focused on a single clinical situation, with vignettes
depicting a hypothetical drug (“Bucarin”) as a chemotherapy for the respondent’s colon can-
cer, costing $80,000, on top of the standard regimen the patient will otherwise receive.
Experiment 2 replicated the Bucarin case, and also introduced seven other scenarios as
shown in Table 1 (one per respondent). This heterogeneity in case presentations is important
because the fraction of moral hazard may depend on whether the treatment directly influences
survival from a potentially fatal disease, or whether the treatment choices impacts mobility/
lifestyle, or whether the treatment merely affects personal appearance (to describe three of our
cases). Thus across a range of conditions, we tested cases involving a drug for lung cancer, a
stent device used for stable coronary artery disease, surgery for gastrointestinal disease, a drug
for macular degeneration, a biologic for psoriasis, a knee replacement surgery for degenerative
arthritis, and spinal surgery for lower back pain. The vignettes cover a wide range of com-
monly encountered and expensive medical situations, varying in severity, rate of progression,
extent of disability, treatment options, physician preferences, and costs.
The vignettes (available from the authors) were fairly extensive and detailed, ranging from
409 to 576 words (494 on average), with an additional 551 words presented for informed con-
sent, writing prompts, etc. All vignettes contained the following components, corresponding
to the information used in clinical decision making by patients and providers: history of pres-
ent illness including medical management of the condition to date, past medical history rele-
vant to the condition, diagnostic testing data where appropriate, and costs of the procedure.
All patients are seen by specialists for the respective condition. These specialists provide
informed consent, covering potential benefits, side effects and risks of the intervention. Total
costs for interventions are typical for such interventions in the US, ranging from $15,000 to
$125,000, as shown in Table 1.
PLOS ONE Distinguishing moral hazard from access
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Manipulations
We varied both the type of insurance and the value of care (high or low, with each subject
receiving a recommendation for one case). High and low value scenarios are broadly consis-
tent with the range of outcomes described in the medical literature. High value scenarios
reflect the more certain and/or more effective outcomes, while low value scenarios reflect the
less certain and/or less effective outcomes. As an example of a value manipulation, in Experi-
ment 1, the high-value condition is for an FDA-approved drug, with proof of safety and effi-
cacy for the patient’s condition, while the low-value condition offers an off-label use for a
condition not specifically considered by the FDA, with no proof of safety and efficacy for the
patient’s specific condition. In the low-value condition, the drug is nonetheless recommended
by the oncologist, as is quite common in the real world [48].
In manipulating the respondent’s insurance status, we asked them to imagine that they are
either (a) uninsured, (b) with traditional insurance, or (c) insured in a cash indemnity pro-
gram. For the uninsured conditions, the text provided:
“Please imagine that you currently do not have health insurance, however you do have the
same amount of wealth and credit that you actually have in the real world (the amount you
provided in your answer above). So, only if you have enough money available, you can pay
for the Bucarin yourself. Think back to your answer to the purchasing power above. If you
do have that much purchasing power, please consider however, other things you may prefer
to do with the money. Please be realistic.“
For the traditional insurance conditions, the text provided:
Table 1. Summary of experimental vignettes.
Disease or Condition Proposed Treatment /
Baseline
Proposed Treatment
High Value Manipulation Low Value Manipulation
Cancer: Adenocarcinoma of
the colon
$80k novel drug /
standard therapy
Drug has been approved by the FDA for colon
cancer and studies show it improves chances of
survival
Drug has not been approved for use in colon cancers.
Oncologist has had good experiences using the drug
off-label
Cancer: Non-small-cell lung
cancer
$125k novel drug / home
hospice
Drug increased average survival by 8 months Drug stopped tumors growth for 4 months but did not
show any survival benefit
Cardiovascular: Coronary
Artery Disease
$55k drug-eluting stent /
medical therapy
The FDA has approved the stent to prevent heart
attacks because it improves survival
Stent is not approved for prophylactic use (prior to
heart attack), but is recommended off-label, with no
survival benefit
Gastrointestinal Disease:
GERD
$45k gastric reflux surgery
/ medical and lifestyle
therapy
Three-quarters of patients experience relief of
their symptoms
Half of patients experience relief of symptoms, but side
effects can be substantial and patient is not optimal
surgical candidate
Age-Related Macular
Degeneration (AMD)
$15k novel drug /
established drug
Novel drug improves vision in 2/3 of cases
compared to 1/3 of cases with established drug
There is less data on the very new novel drug and
doctor recommends sticking with the established drug
Skin/Autoimmune disease:
Psoriasis
$20k biologic drug /
standard medical therapy
Two-thirds of patients who take the drug report
clear skin, and low dose minimizes potential
severe risks
One-third of patients who take drug report clear skin;
side effects can be severe, including cancer
Orthopedic Disease:
Degenerative Arthritis
$70k total knee
replacement surgery /
medical management
Orthopedic surgeon finds instability in right knee
which requires surgery, which should occur now
Orthopedic surgeon finds no instability but predicts
surgery will eventually be needed; but arthritis is still
mild to moderate
Neurologic Disease:
Degenerative Lower Spine
Disease
$85k spinal surgery /
medical management
New surgery removes pain and disability in two-
thirds of patients and most patients struggle to
comply with alternative medical treatments
New surgery removes pain and disability in one-third
of patients, which is equivalent to the results of intense
medical treatment including physical therapy
Every respondent was offered the stipulated baseline treatment, which they would receive if they declined the proposed treatment. Respondents were randomly assigned
to consider one high value or low value treatment against that baseline.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231768.t001
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“Please imagine you have full health insurance, and you have already met your annual
deductible, so there is no additional cost to you out of pocket, if you choose to take [the
treatment]. In deciding, please be realistic.”
The indemnity was described as:
Please imagine you have full health insurance, and you have already met your annual
deductible. Your insurance company has a unique program, in which they cover special
drugs with a cash payment, called an indemnity (similar to car insurance). Because your
physician has indicated that you are a candidate for [the treatment] you receive a $125,000
cash payment from your insurance company. You receive the money regardless of
whether you decide to take [the treatment]. You decide whether you spend the cash on the
[the treatment] or instead keep the money for whatever other purposes you may choose. In
deciding, please be realistic.
Notably, the indeminity script uses the word “cash” three times. In the vignettes, the insur-
ance manipulations were highlighted in boldface text, as shown here. In both of the insurance
conditions, there is no cost-sharing required, on the theory that the patient has already reached
her annual maximum through the cascade of healthcare that culminates in this pivotal deci-
sion, a not-uncommon phenomenon. [22]
Based on the design described above, Experiment 1 had six conditions (3 insurance types x
2 treatment values), in between-subjects design with equal allocation across all variables and
levels thereof. Experiment 2 yielded 48 conditions (3 insurance types x 2 treatment values x 8
clinical scenarios), in between-subjects design with equal allocation across all variables and lev-
els thereof. Manipulations were fully crossed in factorial design to maximize statistical power.
[49,50]
Respondent engagement
On the informed consent page, we warned all respondents that they may be quizzed on the
material, and that they should be careful. To increase engagement and internal validity, we
also included several mandatory writing prompts that interrupted the vignette. Halfway
through the scenario, we asked, “Please refer to the story specifically, and share a sentence
describing how you would feel in this medical situation, and your thoughts about your treat-
ment options described so far.” At the end of the scenario in Experiment 2, we also asked, “On
the next page you will share your decision. First, now please write two sentences putting in
your own words, (1) your understanding of the treatment options, and (2) your insurance situ-
ation, as described above.”
A research assistant (RA) manually reviewed whether respondents provided minimally
meaningful responses to the writing prompts. The RA was blinded to respondents’ experimen-
tal conditions. Those providing junk data were removed.
To further ensure engagement, in both experiments, after the survey on a separate page, we
asked all respondents to identify their insurance type in the vignette. Those answering this
manipulation-check incorrectly were screened. In Experiment 2 we similarly required a cor-
rect answer to a disease-type query, and screened those failing.
Research populations and data quality
In Experiment 1, we recruited human subjects from a platform (Mechanical Turk (“Mturk”))
provided by Amazon.com to collect 613 valid observations. To ensure engagement in the
PLOS ONE Distinguishing moral hazard from access
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materials and reduce the risk of the work being completed by non-human “bots”, we pre-qual-
ified respondents who were successful in at least 90% of prior tasks they had attempted. [47]
We also used TurkPrime to block duplicate IP addresses and verify worker country location
(United States), and we paid $1.25 to each worker, who (on the median) spent 8.0 minutes to
complete the task. The research population was reasonably diverse and randomization success-
fully distributed observable covariates across experimental conditions (S1 Table). After apply-
ing our manipulation checks, RA review of the qualitative responses found no junk data for
exclusion.
In Experiment 2 we expand generalizability by including a range of seven other clinical sce-
narios; quadruple the sample size; replicate with a different respondent population (Survey
Sampling International (SSI)); and recruit a demographically representative pool, tracking U.
S. Census distributions of age, gender, and household income, with successful randomization
across conditions (S2 Table). SSI uses multiple recruitment and incentivization methods,
described in the Supplemental materials. In Experiment 2, we began with 2400 valid observa-
tions, defined as those who passed the insurance-type and disease-type manipulations. A
blinded RA reviewed qualitative responses, and we eliminated 44 respondents who did not
engage meaningfully in the task, yielding 2,356 responses for analysis.
With the above pre-qualification screening and a blinded manual review of qualitative
responses, fraudulent responses, including bots are unlikely to be contaminating the final data
in our analysis. Due to the randomized controlled trial design, any such noise would bias the
analysis towards finding null result. This turns out to be not the case as we see a sharp contrast
among responses under two of three different insurance types and both levels of treatment
value. Additionally, the estimations are consistant across two experiments, conducted with dif-
ferent populations.
Covariates and analysis
We collected standard demographics and respondents’ actual insurance status (as distinct
from the manipulated insurance type descried above) for use as controls. Prior to the vignettes
we also asked each person for their maximum purchasing power (i.e., cash, formal and infor-
mal credit, sellable assets) that could be used “for a very important purchase . . . if absolutely
necessary to make such a purchase, if you absolutely had to do so.” To ensure some level of
introspection on this point, we asked respondents qualitatively “explain briefly how you would
come up with that amount of money. From what sources would you draw to reach that
amount? What might you have to give up?” In some of our models, we used the quantiative
amount as an “impossibility screen” to evaluate subsequent respondent choices to consume
healthcare in the uninsured condition. The vignettes do not ask respondents to imagine differ-
ent purchasing powers than they have in the real world; we exploit this natural variation which
may be salient to respondents. (As it happens, this screen does not substantially change our
results.)
In our regression models, we created subsets of the data to test the theory-driven contrasts
(uninsurance versus indemnity to test the access function of insurance, and indemnity versus
traditional insurance to test for moral hazard). To produce regression-adjusted percent of
patients consuming the healthcare across condition (Fig 2), the main specification employs a
linear probability model, for ease of interpreting coefficients (S3 & S4 Tables). The Supplemen-
tal Information also presents logit and probit models, which generally lead to similar results.
For robustness, we there present analyses with and without controls, and with and without
data screens.
PLOS ONE Distinguishing moral hazard from access
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As shown in Fig 3, to identify a likely counterfactual for each individual respondent, we
also deployed Bayesian simulation analogue to the Peters-Belson method. [51,52,53] This
approach provides greater precision, of particular importance for interpreting potential null
effects.
Results and discussion
Participants’ intent to consume the proposed treatment was very responsive to some variations
on insurance type and treatment value (Fig 2 and Table 2). We find virtually no spending
when respondents lack health insurance, but very substantial spending in the traditional insur-
ance condition. With insurance, respondents were about five times more likely to consume the
proferred healthcare. On the other hand, although the sign for moral hazard is in the theorized
direction, there were no significant differences in consumption between those in the indem-
nity and traditional insurance conditions. This null result persisted in the replication, and
pooling across seven additional vignettes, and regardless of whether we applied regression con-
trols (Table 3) and manipulation checks and alternative logit and probit models (S3 and S4
Tables). The main results are as follows.
We did not power our study to explore specific hypotheses related to individual clinical
conditions; instead we included these manipulations to improve generalizability. Nonetheless,
the Supplemental Information displays regression results for individual scenarios (S5–S12
Tables). We found that respondents tended to be sensitive to the value of the healthcare pro-
posed–just as the factor was highly significant in our pooled models, treatment value made a
detectable difference (at the 0.05 level) to respondent decisions in 5 out of 9 of the individual
disease experiments (including Experiment 1, its replication in Experiment 2, and seven
Fig 2. Percent consuming treatment by insurance type and value of treatment with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals across two
study populations (Panels A & B). Panel A is N = 613 respondents provided by Amazon.com, adjusted for demographics, in a cancer vignette,
either on-label (high value) or off-label (low value). Panel B is N = 2,356 respondents from Survey Sampling International, representative to U.S.
Census, by age, gender, and income; randomized across eight vignettes and adjusted for demographics and vignette. Both samples exclude those
failing insurance-type manipulation check and purchasing-power impossibility check. As shown in Table 2, using a Mann-Whitney U Test and
T-test, the differences between uninsurance and either type of insurance are highly significant; the differences between insurance types are not
significant.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231768.g002
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others). Access was the key function of insurance: in 8 out of 9 of the scenario cases (all but the
psoriasis scenario), those with health insurance consumed more, even with fungible insurance
that had an opportunity cost. In contrast, we found no moral hazard detectable (at the 0.05
level) in any of our scenarios (0 out of 9) when controls are included. Just as in our highly-
powered pooled results, we found no moral hazard that could be distinguished from the null
(at the 0.05 level). Considering the interaction effect, we found that the fungibility of insurance
in the indemnity also did not make respondents detectably more sensitive to the value of the
proposed treatment in any of the scenarios (0 out of 9), the same result as in our overall model.
Strengths and limitations
Our randomized design blinds respondents and avoids certain forms of response bias, while
solving for endogeneity and internal validity, thus allowing causal inferences, unlike typical
surveys. Our vignette-based approach allows study of indemnity insurance plans, which do
not presently exist as a form of primary health insurance. The realistic vignettes drafted by a
physician, represented a wide range of cases of high-cost care, which drive most health spend-
ing, but where it is infeasible to field experiment due to the ethical and practical difficultly of
deny insurance for such life-saving care. This is precisely the domain where the access function
of insurance may be most important [24] but precisely where we cannot extrapolate from
Fig 3. Marginal effects of insurance (moral hazard and access) on intent to consume healthcare under Bayesian Monte Carlo estimation
method, using uninsurance and indemnity counterfactuals (with 95% Confidence Intervals). Amazon.com convenience sample is N = 613
respondents from Mturk, in a cancer vignette, randomized to either on-label (high value) or off-label (low value) proposed treatment. SSI
Demographics-Weighted Sample is from Survey Sampling International, N = 2,356, representative to U.S. Census, by age, gender, and income;
randomized across eight vignettes in high or low value. Controls adjust for demographics, value of proposed healthcare, and vignette. Both samples
exclude those failing insurance-type manipulation check and purchasing-power impossibility check. When controls are applied, moral hazard is not
statistically significant under either sample. Access is significant under both samples.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231768.g003
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studies of routine, inexpensive healthcare. [54] In this domain, discrete choice experiments,
like the one we fielded, provide a useful approach. [46,47]
We replicated our findings in two independent and diverse research populations. One pro-
vided incentives for respondents to pay close attention, and another provided a more demo-
graphically-representative sample.
One interesting feature of our vignette approach could be counted as a strength (for theo-
retical clarity) and a weakness (for realism): we excluded implicit forms of insurance that exist
in the United States. [55] Specifically, for the respondents in the uninsured conditions, we did
not make salient the fact that they could get some healthcare in hospital emergency rooms,
without showing proof of payment, due to a Federal law called EMTALA. Further, although
we did ask them to consider their access to credit when estimating their maximum purchasing
power, we did not make especially salient the fact that they could rack up medical bills and ulti-
mately fail to pay them, perhaps even discharging them in bankruptcy. These implicit forms of
insurance have many disadvantages and inefficiencies, but they are one reason that prior stud-
ies of explicit insurance have not found major benefits for health. Thus, the uptake rates
shown in our uninsured conditions are likely unrealistically low, since in the United States
access would often in fact be provided through these implicit insurance mechanisms (making
nobody truly uninsured in this sense). Nonetheless, as the analytic baseline for standard eco-
nomic theory [20], the truly uninsured patient is the relevant construct to simulate, since only
such a person is fully incentivized to make cost-benefit tradeoffs.
Our methodology has other limitations. Most importantly, respondents may not have fully
grasped the importance of the insurance type manipulation. Since indemnities are not com-
monly used in health insurance, notwithstanding the bold type used in our case presentations,
respondents may have failed to appreciate that they would receive a cash payment, which they
could spend on anything else they preferred. Nonetheless, respondents noticed and reacted to
the relatively subtle and complicated manipulations concerning the value of the proposed
treatment, with statistical significance at the .01 level. Moreover, we tested respondents ex post
to determine whether they remembered which type of insurance plan they were in and we
Table 2. Bivariate tests of statistical significance for differences in treatment consumption between insurance types, with subsets for treatment value (Low, High,
Both).
Panel A: Online Convenience Sample Experiment (Amazon.com)
Uninsured minus Indemnity Indemnity minus Traditional
Value of Healthcare Low High Both Low High Both
Mann-Whitney U test (CLESa) 0.389��� 0.303��� 0.345��� 0.482 0.451 0.468
T-test (Mean Differenceb) -0.222��� -0.394��� -0.309��� -0.037 -0.098 -0.065
Obs N1,N2 101,100 103,102 204,202 100,105 102,102 202,207
Panel B: Online Census-Weighted Experiment (SSI Sample)
Uninsured minus Indemnity Indemnity minus Traditional
Value of Healthcare Low High Both Low High Both
Mann-Whitney U test (CLESa) 0.400��� 0.331��� 0.366��� 0.468 0.487 0.480
T-test (Mean Differenceb) -0.201��� -0.339��� -0.268��� -0.064 -0.027 -0.040
Obs N1,N2 366,351 425,356 791,707 351,452 356,406 707,858
a CLES stands for the Common Language Effect Size, which is the probability that variable for the first group is larger than variable for the second group.
b Mean Difference for each T-test is the mean of the second group subtracted from the mean of the first group.
“���” significant at 0.1% level
“��” significant at 1% level
“�” significant at 5% level.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231768.t002
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excluded those who failed. In particular, respondents in the indemnity condition had to cor-
rectly respond that they were in the condition where the insurer would pay them “cash”,
which they could choose to spend on the treatment, or not.
Notwithstanding general findings that vignette research can be valid if done appropriately
[14,42–47], a variety of biases may infect vignette decisions compared to real world decisions.
For example, in the real world, perhaps respondents would be more likely to feel the pressure
of alternative needs to spend money, especially when sick and unable to work. Or respondents
may be more likely accept their physicians’ recommendations, in the heat of a clinical
Table 3. Linear probability models on intent to consume treatment.
Panel A: Online Convenience Sample Experiment (Amazon.com)
Uninsured vs Indemnity Insurance (Access) Traditional Insurance vs Indemnity (Moral Hazard)
Indemnity Insurance 0.222��� 0.225���
(0.064) (0.067)
Traditional Insurance 0.037 0.055
(0.068) (0.070)
Value of Healthcare 0.015 0.012 0.188�� 0.180�
(0.064) (0.066) (0.068) (0.071)
Indemnity X Value 0.172 0.165
(0.090) (0.094)
Traditional X Value 0.061 0.034
(0.096) (0.099)
Constant 0.208��� 0.146 0.430��� 0.248
(0.045) (0.202) (0.049) (0.223)
Controls NO YES NO YES
R-squared 0.121 0.128 0.054 0.073
N 406 390 409 396
Panel B: Online Census-Weighted Experiment (SSI Sample)
Uninsured vs Indemnity Insurance (Access) Traditional Insurance vs Indemnity Insurance (Moral
Hazard)
Indemnity Insurance 0.201��� 0.218���
(0.035) (0.036)
Traditional Insurance 0.064 0.032
(0.035) (0.036)
Value of Healthcare 0.058 0.076� 0.196��� 0.194���
(0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038)
Indemnity X Value 0.138�� 0.121�
(0.048) (0.050)
Traditional X Value -0.037 -0.016
(0.050) (0.051)
Constant 0.227��� 0.338��� 0.427��� 0.676���
(0.024) (0.095) (0.026) (0.105)
Controls NO YES NO YES
R-squared 0.097 0.167 0.033 0.107
N 1,498 1,377 1,565 1,427
Standard errors shown in parentheses.
“���” significant at 0.1% level
“��” significant at 1% level
“�” significant at 5% level. Controls include demographics and vignette-type.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231768.t003
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encounter. Across our 16 vignettes, with eight diseases and two levels of quality, driving much
different base rates of consumption, we see consistent dynamics for our experimental
manipulations.
We also simplified the healthcare system in various ways. We did not simulate the various
sorts of cost-sharing profiles that could be applied to traditional insurance or indemnities. In fact,
large-dollar spending often happens after cost-sharing maxima have been exhausted by prior
spending. [22] We also used individuals’ real-world incomes and maximum purchasing powers,
but randomly assigned them to experimental insurance statuses, without regard for their capacity
to afford insurance premiums (a remarkably complicated question, given the explicit and implicit
premium subsidies that exist in the employer and individual healthcare markets). The distinction
between high value and low value care in some vignettes was more stark than would typically be
the case in actual medical practice. Nonetheless, our vignettes provided a clean test of consump-
tion decisions in the idealized-but-complex clinical situations presented.
Conclusions
Fig 3 summarizes our primary findings. We were consistently unable to find a significant effect
of moral hazard waste, and the upper ranges of our confidence intervals help rule out the
hypothesis that the problem is substantial in the experimental sample. In contrast, we consis-
tently found a substantial effect of insurance to provide access to expensive healthcare. These
suggest that moral hazard in the healthcare sector may not be large, but the benefit of insur-
ance providing access to expensive healthcare could be substantial.
This research project sheds light on moral hazard, which has preoccupied health economics
and U.S. health policy for half a century. By testing a novel counterfactual of indemnity insur-
ance, we distinguished the access function of health insurance from waste, and thus informed
longstanding debates about how fulsome health insurance coverage should be.
Importantly, we focus on expensive interventions, associated with serious illness, which
drives aggregate health spending. [21] Our data suggest that in these circumstances, moral haz-
ard waste is not substantial, since the vast majority of spending stimulated by insurance would
happen with fungible insurance, which preserves a price signal for consumers. We make no
claim that these findings can or should be extrapolated directly to more routine care decisions.
Healthcare is far from an ideal market: it is rife with wasteful spending and infected by all
sorts of market failures, including the misaligned incentives of healthcare providers. Our data
show what we know obtains in the real world: healthcare consumers are often willing to con-
sume low-value care, when their physicians recommend it. Yet, our data show that the prob-
lem exists regardless of whether patients have a traditional insurance policy that occludes the
price of care or an indemnity policy that makes the price salient along with the opportunity
costs of consumption. Thus, our data helps to pinpoint the problem, and helps us understand
where future policymaking should focus. For example, our study suggests that it will be more
effective to align incentives of providers with health and thrift, rather than placing more risk
on patients.
Our data is consistent with macro-economic data, showing that the U.S. has some of the
highest healthcare spending along with very high levels of out of pocket patient cost-exposure.
Countries with insubstantial patient cost exposure have some of the most efficient healthcare
systems, delivering impressive health outcomes at lower overall costs than in the United States
[56]. Our data is also consistent with research findings that providers drive consumptions
much more than patients [18,19] and that patients exposed to cost decline both high-value and
low-value are alike. [15,16,17] These studies have been unable to distinguish the access func-
tion of insurance in particular.
PLOS ONE Distinguishing moral hazard from access
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231768 April 17, 2020 13 / 17
The lack of healthcare consumption associated with uninsurance and underinsurance
appear to be a much more substantial problem than moral hazard associated with fulsome
insurance. Health policy should accordingly reconsider patient-cost exposure and pursue
other measures to reduce the prevalence of low-value healthcare.
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